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A DYNAMIC PANEL DATA APPROACH 
This work considers whether the difficulty for obtaining funding affects the choice of 
organizational form for franchise chains. We created a panel of Spanish franchisors who were 
observed from 1996 to 2002, and calculated a dynamic, partial-adjustment model for 
ownership structure, using the generalised method of moments in first differences. This 
allowed us to introduce auto-regression and to use endogenous explanatory variables. The 
results obtained show that the greater a chain’s liquidity and return on assets and the lower its 
debt, the less likely it is to operate as a franchisor. This supports the financial argument. 
However, the requirements for investment in growth are not significant, and age shows does 
not show the expected sign. Finally, we verified the partial-adjustment model for ownership 
structure, obtaining a high adjustment speed of 78-69%. 
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  1IS FRANCHISING A FINANCIAL TOOL? 
A DYNAMIC PANEL DATA APPROACH 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Although there is plenty of literature on franchising
1, one matter that is as yet unresolved is 
why the empirical studies do not support the opinion of entrepreneurs (franchisors) regarding 
this business formula as a means of obtaining finance (Dant, 1995). In other words, why do 
franchisors prefer franchising to other methods of obtaining funds, such as borrowing or 
taking on new financial partners. Most studies confirm the most widely-accepted theory that 
chains decide to franchise because, by converting the manager of an establishment into an 
“entrepreneur” who is paid with residual rent, they are better aligning the manager’s interests 
with those of the chain, thus avoiding the problems of control and incentives that often arise 
in working relationships
2. However, this academic consensus does not tie in with the fact that 
60% of the managers surveyed by Dant (1995) mentioned access to capital as the reason for 
adopting franchising or with doubts as to whether the franchisee is really personally 
responsible for management of the establishment. In a recent survey, only 23% of Spanish 
chains considered it “essential” for the franchisee to be personally responsible for the business 
(Sánchez Gómez, 2006, p. 102).  
Another theoretical argument is that franchising is used to facilitate access to specific scarce 
resources
3, such as capital (Ozanne and Hunt, 1971; Caves and Murphy, 1976), management 
skills (Oxenfeldt and Kelly, 1969; Norton, 1988) and local information (Minkler, 1990). 
Unlike the first argument, this one has always been controversial, both because of its 
theoretical basis and because the empirical results obtained so far, especially with regard to 
financial resources, have not been conclusive. This paper focuses on this matter of funding. 
The idea of franchising as a means of funding was initially criticized because it was 
considered more expensive than other alternatives because of the risk premium involved. 
Rubin (1990) and Norton (1995) argue that a franchisee should demand a larger risk premium 
than a shareholder because the latter’s assets are much more diversified. The shareholder’s 
                                                 
1 See, for a report on the research carried out over more than 25 years on franchising, the recent work by Blair 
and Lafontaine (2005). 
2 See Caves and Murphy (1976) and, especially, Rubin (1978). 
3 The first to establish this argument were Oxenfeldt and Kelly (1969). 
  2income depends on the income from all the establishments in the chain, whereas that of the 
franchisee depends on a single establishment. Combs and Ketchen (1999), however, suggest 
that the advantage of franchising lies in savings in other types of cost, namely, the transaction 
costs that are avoided because the owner and the manager of the establishment are different 
people and those that are avoided because there is less risk of adverse selection in the process 
of selecting franchisees than in selecting employees (Shane, 1996). 
The purpose of this paper, therefore, is to determine whether the use of franchising may also 
involve a financial component. We argue that the reason why franchisees are a cheaper source 
of funding is because, by assigning variability (risk) to the party with the greatest capacity for 
influencing the establishment’s results (the franchisee), the transaction costs involved in the 
activity are reduced. This is far from being an inefficient way of allocating risk. Quite the 
opposite, because franchisees see less risk in managing a single establishment in which their 
effort is the key to success than in participating in all the establishments, in which their effort 
as one of many shareholders will not necessarily have a direct influence on the result. 
A second contribution of this paper is an empirical one. Most of the studies carried out are 
based on samples of large North American companies that are listed on the stock exchange, in 
order to gain access to their financial data. But it is precisely such companies that find it 
easiest to gain access to resources, and this may be the reason why the studies reject the 
financial argument. Our study includes small and medium franchise chains, some of which 
have little experience and are not listed. This enables us to extend the previous empirical 
studies to the whole business universe. Also, since we have a time series, we have been able 
not only to check the unobservable heterogeneity in the panel data
4, but also to model the 
dynamic adjustment of ownership structure. Franchisors are likely to work with certain 
expectations regarding optimal structure. That is, they establish an objective for growth in line 
with their perception of the costs of opening a franchised or owned establishment. This target 
will be achieved over time by trial and error, depending on their experience (Castrogiovanni, 
Combs and Justis, 2006, p. 30). We use the generalised methods of moments in first 
differences. This not only allows us to introduce an element of autoregression in the model, 
                                                 
4 At an international level, only the article by Minkler and Park (1994) on North American companies includes 
this methodology for comparing the financial argument. The studies by Pénard, Raynaud and Saussier (2003), 
based on a sample of French companies, and by Lafontaine and Shaw (2005), focusing on the US market, as well 
as that by Minkler and Park (1994), also use panel data but for comparing other arguments, not the matter of lack 
of funding. 
  3which is essential for making it more explanatory, but also to use endogenous explanatory 
variables. 
The rest of the article is organized as follows. In the second section, we carry out a theoretical 
review of the reasons for franchising, focusing on the capital scarcity argument. In the third 
section, we describe the process followed for obtaining data, the sources used and the 
econometric model adopted. Finally, we state the results and conclusions of the study, in 
sections four and five respectively. 
2. THEORETICAL REVIEW 
2.1. The classic hypothesis: aligning incentives 
The most widely-accepted explanation for franchising is that it solves the agency problem 
between the chain and those responsible for the individual establishments. This problem 
means that, when the owner and the manager are not the same person, the latter may pursue 
their own interests instead of those of the principal they represent (making less effort, using 
the company car for personal reasons, etc.). The reason for such behavior is that  the manager 
does not have to bear all the costs, especially when a fixed wage is paid. An agency cost is 
therefore generated because the managers’ and the company’s incentives are different (Rubin, 
1978; Brickley, Dark and Weisbach, 1991). By converting the manager of an establishment 
into a franchisee, granting him or her the residual rights on the establishment (such as the 
residual rent), the interests of the parties are much better aligned. 
Franchising therefore becomes more attractive when there is a greater possibility of 
opportunistic behavior by the agent (or manager of the establishment). This leads us to draw 
up the following hypothesis: 
H1: The greater the risk of opportunism on the part of the agent, either because of 
the need for a great effort on the part of the manager or because of the high costs 
of supervision, the more likely it is that franchising will be adopted.  
The empirical evidence supporting this argument is practically unanimous. Authors such as 
Brickley and Dark (1987), Norton (1988), Brickley, Dark and Weisbach (1991), Minkler 
(1990), Lafontaine (1992, 1995), López and Ventura (2002), Perales and Vázquez (2003), 
Lafontaine and Shaw (2005) and Castrogiovanni, Combs and Justis (2006) find that the 
  4greater the cost of supervising those responsible for the establishments, the more likely it is 
that franchising will be adopted. In other words, owned establishments will be located in 
places in which control costs are low, whereas franchised establishments will exist where the 
cost of control is greater. Caves and Murphy (1976), Lafontaine (1992), Scott (1995), Slade 
(1996), Bercovitz (1998), López and Ventura (2002) and Perales and Vázquez (2003) note a 
greater tendency to franchise establishments in locations in which the effort of the manager is 
key for the success of the establishment. 
2.2. Risk premium and financial costs 
In spite of the clear empirical results supporting the above argument, entrepreneurs continue 
to insist that one of the main reasons for using franchising is that it obviates the need to search 
for funds. Lafontaine (1992), for example, found that 76 out of 130 of the franchisors 
questioned for his study saw franchising as a mechanism for gaining the funds needed to grow 
their businesses fast. Dant (1995) also noted that lack of capital was one of the main reasons 
why companies started franchising, with 60% of the entrepreneurs interviewed stating access 
to capital as the reason for using the franchise system. Moreover, in a recent study, only 23% 
of Spanish chains considered it “essential” for the franchisee to be personally responsible for 
the business (Sánchez Gómez, 2006, p. 102), thus contradicting the claim that the main reason 
for using a franchise is to align interests.  
Access to limited resources is another of the alternative arguments used to explain the use of 
franchising (Oxenfeldt and Kelly, 1969). These authors state that the franchisor will decide to 
franchise some of his establishments when faced with difficulties for obtaining limited 
funding. Obtaining the capital needed for expanding the company is the typical situation 
(Oxenfeldt and Kelly, 1969; Ozanne and Hunt, 1971; Caves and Murphy, 1976)
5. Franchisees 
often provide a large proportion of the investment needed to set up the new establishment, so 
the franchisor’s effort is much smaller. However, it is unlikely that franchisors reason in terms 
of financial effort, but rather in terms of capital costs which are more relevant for them. So the 
question to be asked is why the cost of expanding the business through franchising seems 
                                                 
5 Other important resources that can be obtained by franchising are management skills (Oxenfeldt and Kelly, 
1969; Norton, 1988) and local information (Minkler, 1990). 
  5lower (although it is the dominant form)
6 than that of other formulae such as borrowing or 
finding new financial partners (leading to growth in the form of “owned” establishments). 
An initial explanation is that during the first few years of life of a chain, the franchisor is not a 
well-known company so there may be doubts as to the viability of the business, making it 
difficult to obtain the necessary funding to expand the commercial network. The problem can 
be solved by franchising and, in the long term, once the company has gained access to 
funding, the franchisor can recover control of the network by re-purchasing the 
establishments (Oxenfeldt and Kelly, 1969; Hunt, 1973).  
There are at least three weak points in this argument. The first is that it does not explain why 
it is possible to convince the prospective franchisees but not the banks or, rather, the private 
equity firms that specialize in this type of operation. The second, proposed by  Rubin (1978) 
and better known, is that it seems riskier for an individual to become a franchisee than a 
shareholder in the same franchise business. Variability in results for a franchisee depend on a 
single establishment, whereas for a shareholder they depend on global results (Rubin, 1990; 
Norton, 1995). If the results of all the chain’s establishments are taken together, the individual 
risk of each establishment is likely to be eliminated, leaving only the actual business risk 
which exists in any method of obtaining resources. So, if franchises are more risky, 
franchisees will demand greater compensation, making this a very costly way of obtaining 
funds for the franchisor. 
Thirdly, a franchise contract means that the franchisor (principal) shares the risk (business 
variability) with the franchisees (agents). If we assume that the agents are more risk averse 
than the principals, as established by many agency models, then franchising would not be the 
most efficient financing mechanism because the use of owned establishments (financed with 
shareholders’ equity or debt) would be a better means of assigning the risk (with a lower risk 
premium). In order for this argument to be valid, both franchisor and franchisee should be risk 
neutral. 
Combs and Ketchen (1999) improve the argument by explaining that franchisees may be a 
cheaper formula for financing because they reduce two types of cost: a) by managing the 
business directly, the creditor of the residual rent does not incur agency costs between the 
owner and the manager; and b) if the franchisee invests directly and accepts the consequences 
                                                 
6 The results of our data base show that in Spain 64% of establishments are franchises. 
  6of his own decisions, there will be less probability that candidates will try to hide their skills 
(in contrast with the typical process of selecting employees) (Shane, 1996). So this argument 
would explain why the owners of chains state that franchising is an attractive form of 
financing. But Combs and Ketchen (1999) do not explain why the franchise contract 
(franchisor – franchisee – employees) generates fewer agency costs than an ownership 
contract (owner – manager – employees).   Additionally, it is increasingly frequent for a 
franchisor to invite participation from other shareholders, normally investors (Franquicias 
hoy, April 2007, p. 34). This even complicates more the franchise contract, and consequently 
it raises agency costs, because it probably adds a new relationship, being then the sequence of 
contracts now: owner – manager – franchisee - employees. 
A parallel explanation is to reconsider the argument that franchising is a good way of 
obtaining funds, especially when other forms are costly, but this requires rebuttal of the poor 
risk assignation argument. According to this, because there is greater risk, franchisees must 
demand a higher risk premium if they are to act rationally, but if they demand it and are 
accepted, it would be the franchisors that are no longer acting rationally because they have 
more efficient forms of financing. This paradox can be resolved if we consider that the risk 
perceived by the franchisee of investment x in chain j is lower than if he becomes a 
shareholder in the same chain j investing the same amount x. This is because, through a 
franchise contract, the investor (franchisee) has more capacity for influencing the result of the 
investment than a shareholder, especially if the company is a limited liability company that is 
not listed on the stock exchange (as is typically the case of many franchisors, especially in 
Europe). 
Milgrom and Roberts (1992, p. 219) argue that the value generated in a relationship is greater 
when we introduce variables in remuneration to reduce the error in calculating the agent’s 
effort (in this case, the result of the investment). The variability in the results of a specific 
establishment will depend, amongst other things, on the effort of the franchisee, his skills, 
business model, how he adapts this model to the characteristics of the local market and a 
random component which we shall call “nature”. The franchisee is the person who knows best 
his level of effort and skills so, considering also that he is from the local area so knows the 
local market well, then the variability perceived by the franchisee will be relatively small 
(only nature and, perhaps, if the business is suitable or not). If, instead, the same franchisee 
were to become a shareholder, then the perceived variability would be much greater because, 
  7apart from the variability that stems from the actual nature of the business and, perhaps, 
knowing whether the business suits the local situation, he has no information about the effort 
to be made by the agents managing the establishments, nor about their skills. The perceived 
variability is therefore greater and the risk involved will lead to a demand for higher return on 
assets. If, moreover, the investor becomes a minority shareholder in a closed limited 
company, the risk of becoming trapped with no room for movement is even greater. 
This argument suggests that the conventional principal-agent model is not applicable when 
the parties do not consider only the component described as “nature” to be random but also all 
the variables over which they do not have direct control. Barzel (1989, p. 56) argues that the 
party may become more of a residual claimant depending on their capacity for influencing 
results because this would reduce transaction costs, especially the problems of measurement 
and debates as to who should sustain any losses. Assignation of part of the establishment risk 
to the franchisee is therefore optimal because this is the party that is most likely to influence 
the result, thus bringing down transaction costs. A shareholder may run a lower risk from 
“nature” but may perceive more risk because he cannot control the action of other owners of 
production factors even though their action may be relevant for the success of the business. 
This approach fits in with the fact that Allen and Lueck (2002) do not find any empirical 
evidence to support the risk argument in the traditional model of the principal-agent theory in 
sharecropping contracts and that their results fit in better with the problems of measurement 
and of  transaction costs of the Economics of Transaction Costs (Allen and Lueck, 2002, 
pp:95-119). 
From the above, we can establish the hypothesis that franchising is a method of funding that 
serves as an alternative to other methods that facilitate the opening of owned establishments 
and that it will be chosen depending on the relative costs of all the methods: 
 H2: The greater the costs of alternative sources of finance, the more likely it is 
that franchising will be adopted. 
Arguments against this hypothesis include the practice of some companies of financing their 
own franchisees and that large companies also use franchising, even though they should have 
no problem for gaining access to capital (Brickley, Dark and Weisbach, 1991; Carney and 
Gedajlovic, 1991; Combs and Castrogiovanni, 1994).   
  8We consider, along the same lines as Combs and Ketchen (1999), that the financial argument 
complements rather than substitutes the incentive alignment argument. It is therefore 
necessary to control for the effect of both to see if the two arguments are still relevant. The 
chains that finance their own franchisees are a minority and are very large, such as 
McDonalds or, in Spain, Telepizza. For such organizations, it is probably more important to 
control the network and find managers who are keen to work than to find the means of 
funding. This does not mean, however, that smaller, less well-known organizations find 
financing a problem. 
The empirical evidence on this argument is confusing, partly because variables have been 
used that do not exactly represent the idea of scarcity of capital or of the relative costs of other 
sources of funding. Also because some statistically relevant data seem to support the 
argument but do not prove it outright. In the former case, Thompson (1992) and Martin and 
Justis (1993) obtain evidence of greater use of franchising the greater the initial investment 
needed to open a new establishment. But, since the investments involved are almost always 
below 79,000€, the investment is actually small: many bank managers would be prepared to 
finance such amounts without even consulting their risk departments.  
In the second case, Caves and Murphy (1976), Lafontaine and Kaufmann (1994), Combs and 
Castrogiovanni (1994) and Dant and Kaufmann (2003) note a higher proportion of owned 
establishments in more mature franchise chains. Dant and Kaufmann (2003) and 
Castrogiovanni, Combs and Justis (2006) obtain a negative relationship between the 
percentage of franchised establishments and the size of the chain, thus supporting this 
argument. Martin and Justis (1993) compare the growth of mature and immature franchise 
chains
7, reaching the conclusion that it is the latter that depend most on franchising at times 
when it is difficult to gain access to the capital market. This same variable has been used by 
other authors such as Thompson (1992) and Combs and Castrogiovanni (1994). Sen (1993) 
notes that the youngest chains set higher entry fees for their franchisees than more mature 
chains, indicating that the former face greater difficulties in obtaining funds. Finally, Michael 
(2003) points to the existence in the market of “first mover advantages” in the restaurant 
                                                 
7 These authors state that immature franchise chains are those that have been in the market for less than 10 years, 
having a total number of establishments that is equal to or less than the average number of establishments in the 
sector. 
  9sector, allowing entrepreneurs willing to franchise to gain a competitive advantage over other 
companies in the sector
8. 
However, it is only Norton (1995) and Combs and Ketchen (1999) who have used more 
specific measures for capital scarcity, such as the loan or liquidity ratio, obtaining evidence 
that franchising can really be an alternative means of funding. The studies based on direct 
surveys also support the financial argument. Mc Guire (1971, p.6) states, “…the single most 
important reason for adopting franchised distribution would be to conserve or acquire capital, 
while at the same time attempting to establish an effective distribution network as quickly as 
possible”. Similar results are obtained by Lafontaine (1992) and Dant (1995). Finally, Table 1 
shows some of the studies that have analyzed this argument. 
Table 1: Effect of capital scarcity on the probability of franchising 
Author(s)  Year  Data  Measurement  % of franchisees 
Caves and 
Murphy  1976 Sector  data  Age  (−) 
Brickley and Dark  1987 
1. Companies in different sectors 
2. Establishments in 36 chains in different 
sectors 
1. Initial investment 
2. Initial investment 
− 
− 
Brickley, Dark 
and Weisbach  1991 
1. Sector data on a national level 
2. Establishments in 36 chains  
1. Size 
2. Initial investment 
(+) 
− 
Carney and 
Gedajlovic (1991)  1991  128 Canadian companies in different 
sectors 
1. Size 
2. Age  
3. Initial investment 
(+) 
(+) 
+ 
Thompson  1992  Franchises in different sectors 
1. Initial investment 
2. Growth 
+ 
+ 
Lafontaine  1992  Business franchises in all sectors  Initial investment  − 
Martin and Justis  1993  57 franchise chains in fast food, hotels 
and convenience store sectors 
1. Initial investment 
2. Growth 
+ 
+ 
Lafontaine and 
Kaufmann  1994  130 surveys amongst Presidents of 
franchise systems in the US 
1. Age 
2. A dummy variable with value 1 
if the franchisor is a subsidiary of 
a larger company. 
(−) 
 
(−) 
Note: The brackets in the last column indicate that the variable used for estimating difficulty of access to funding is inversely 
related to the size of the funding, so the sign is likely to be the opposite of what was expected. 
                                                 
8 This author shows with this result that franchising is a mechanism for acquiring funds because the existence of 
advantages for whoever takes the first move is one of the key assumptions in the scarcity of capital argument. 
So, “Initially many franchisors establish franchises in order to penetrate the market as widely and rapidly as 
possible, thus pre-empting valuable territory from competitors” (Oxenfeldt and Kelly 1969, p.74). 
  10Table 1: Effect of capital scarcity on the probability of franchising (Continuation) 
Author(s)  Year  Data  Measurement  % of franchisees 
Minkler and Park  1994  Data panel 1975-1989 
1. Real interest ratio 
2. Growth 
3. Age  
− 
− 
(+) 
Combs and 
Castrogiovanni  1994 558  franchise  chains 
1. Size 
2. Age  
3. Growth 
(+) 
(−) 
+ 
Norton  1995  25 franchise and 25 non-franchise chains  Debt ratio in books and on 
market  + 
Combs and 
Ketchen  1999  91 restaurant chains  
1. Pert 
2. Debt ratio 
3. Liquidity 
4. Return on assets 
(−) 
+ 
(−) 
(−) 
López and 
Ventura  2002  270 franchise head offices operating in 
Spain 
1. Initial investment 
2. Age  
3. Growth 
− 
(−) 
− 
Dant and 
Kaufmann  2003  152 surveys on fast food chains 
1. Size 
2. Age  
3. Internal access to funding 
(−) 
(−) 
(−) 
Castrogiovanni, 
Combs and Justis  2006 439  franchise  chains 
1. Size 
2. Age  
(−) 
(+) 
Note: The brackets in the last column indicate that the variable used for estimating difficulty of access to funding is inversely 
related to the size of the funding, so the sign is likely to be the opposite of what was expected. 
3. METHODOLOGY 
3.1. Data compilation 
The above hypotheses were tested using a data panel with information on Spanish franchise 
chains operating in Spain during the period 1996-2002. The data used were mostly obtained 
from the Professional Franchise Guides published by Tormo & Asociados, the starting-point 
for the data base, and by Barbadillo & Asociados, from the Spanish Yearbook on Franchising, 
published by Franchisa, and from the Official Book on Franchises in Spain, published by the 
Spanish Association of Franchisors. We started out with the guides giving data for 1996 and 
gradually added all the chains that appeared year by year. 
  11All this was completed with information obtained from the franchisors’ web sites, annual 
reports and press items, with a view to resolving three problems. First, some data were 
inconsistent amongst the different guides. Second, when data on new channels was added, it 
was found that several chains changed their name from one year to the next so that it was not 
clear if the company was the same one or a new one with a similar name. These problems 
were resolved one by one on the basis of all the available information. Finally, any chains that 
the guides reported as being Spanish but that in fact were not were removed from the data 
base. 
The financial information was obtained from the SABI data base, which informs on all 
companies operating in Spain. Eventually, after checking all the information in the data base, 
the final sample comprised 1,229 chains. However, because of the missing information on 
some variables it was necessary to use many fewer chains in the regressions. 
3.2. Description of the model and variables 
The empirical model was chosen taking into account the potential dynamic nature of the 
ownership structure of franchise chains suggested in the results obtained by Pénard, Raynaud 
and Saussier (2003) and Lafontaine and Shaw (2005). In these two studies, the graphs show 
that franchise chains seem to develop until they achieve a target ownership structure, after 
which they remain more or less stable. Franchise chains will therefore readjust their structure 
periodically towards what they consider to be the target proportion of owned and franchised 
establishments, which they are not prepared to depart from. Since the estimation was carried 
out graphically in previous studies, we needed to analyze whether this target level really 
exists and, if so, at what rate the company moves towards it. Partial-adjustment dynamic 
models suit this approach. They establish that changes in the percentage of franchised 
establishments (PFDOSit – PFDOSit-1) partially absorb the difference between the target 
percentage of franchised establishments for period t (PFDOSi t*) and this percentage for 
period t-1 (PFDOSi t-1): 
() ( ) 1 1 * − − − = − it it it it PFDOS PFDOS PFDOS PFDOS α     [1] 
where coefficient α, ∈ [0, 1], measures the speed of adjustment, and is inversely related to the 
costs of the adjustment that prevent them from reaching the desired structure. We thus obtain: 
  12( ) 1 1 * − − + = it it it PFDOS PFDOS PFDOS α α      [2] 
If the adjustment costs are zero, that is, α=1, * it it PFDOS PFDOS = , then franchise chains 
automatically reach their target for franchised establishments. If, on the other hand, α=0, 
, the transaction or adjustment costs are so high that the chains never 
reach their target proportion. The process of adjustment is a balance between the costs of 
adjustment towards the target proportion of franchised establishments and the costs of not 
being in balance. 
1 − it it = PFDOS PFDOS
Since the desired level of franchised establishments cannot be observed, we consider that it 
can be modelled as a linear function of capital scarcity and of franchisors’ incentive systems. 
This leads us to the following equation: 
it it
it it it it it it it
PMIN a
EXTJ a ANTG a a LIQUID a END a INVINI a a PFDOS
µ + +
+ + + + + + + =
7
6 5 4 3 2 1 0 Re *
  [3] 
where   is the target level for franchised establishments in chain i in year t, and its 
explanatory variables are initial investment (INVINI), debt ratio (END), liquidity ratio 
(LIQUID), return on assets (Re), age of the chain (ANTG), establishments in foreign 
countries (EXTJ) and minimum population (PMIN). 
it PFDOS*
If we include equation (3) in equation (2), considering that the estimators were calculated 
using panel data, we obtain: 
()
it i
t
t it it it
it it it it it it
Y PMIN a EXTJ a ANTG a
a LIQUID a END a INVINI a PFDOS a PFDOS
µ γ α α α
α α α α α α
+ + + + + +
+ + + + + − + =
∑
=
−
2002
1996
7 6 5
4 3 2 1 1 0 Re 1
 
where  is a set of dummy time variables for each year including any invariant time 
effect for the company that is not included in the regression. We also include 
∑
=
2002
1996 t
t Y
i γ , which is the 
company effect and which we assume to be constant for company i over year t; and  i µ , which 
is the error term. 
  13In the estimates, we apply the generalised method of moments (GMM) drawn up for dynamic 
panel data models by Arellano and Bond (1991). This methodology was specifically devised 
to resolve econometric difficulties that are relevant in this work: (a) the presence of 
unobservable individual effects (in this case, company effects). These are eliminated by 
taking first differences for all the variables; (b) the autoregression process in the data on 
behavior of the target level of franchised establishments (that is, the need to use a model with 
lagged dependant variables to find the dynamic nature of decisions on the ownership structure 
of chains); and (c) possible endogeneity in the independent variables. The panel estimator 
controls for this possible endogeneity by using internal instruments, that is, instruments that 
are based on lagged values for the explanatory variables. 
The consistency of the GMM estimator depends on the validity of the instruments, which is 
checked by two tests suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991). The first is to over-identify the 
Sargan restrictions, proving the joint validity of the instruments for estimating GMM. This 
test confirms the lack of correlation between the instruments and the error term in our model. 
The second test examines the hypothesis of the lack of series correlation in first difference 
residuals (m2). In our models, this hypothesis is always refuted. Even if there is a first-level 
series correlation (m1) in the differentiated residuals, this is caused by the first difference in 
the models. 
Variables 
The dependent variable is defined as the percentage of franchised establishments in the total. 
The independent variables indicating capital scarcity for the company and the agency 
argument are described below. Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics, and Table 3 the 
correlation amongst the variables. 
a) Initial investment in the establishment (INVINI), defined as the amount, in millions 
of euros, that the franchisee must pay to set up the business, including the entry fee. We 
believe the initial investment gives an idea of the funds needed for growth in the chain. We 
believe the higher the initial investment, the more funds will be needed by the franchisor to 
achieve growth in the chain and, therefore, the latter is more likely to resort to franchisees as a 
source of finance.
9 Although this variable was used to measure the investment risk and the 
                                                 
9 This variable has been used by many authors including Brickley and Dark (1987), Brickley, Dark and 
Weisbach (1991), Thompson (1992), Lafontaine (1992), Martin and Justis (1993) and López and Ventura 
(2002). 
  14financial argument, it was only used in this way when there were no other more precise 
variables to show the scarcity or costs of other sources of funding. 
b) Debt ratio (END), defined as ((Total Liabilities – Shareholders’ Equity) / Total 
Liabilities) x 100. This reflects the weight of short and long-term debt over the company’s 
total liabilities
10. As the level of debt in a company grows, its capacity for obtaining further 
funding for expansion decreases. It therefore seems reasonable for it to resort to franchising, 
which would provide a large proportion of the funds needed.  
c) Liquidity ratio (LIQUID), defined as (Working assets - Stocks)/Liquid liabilities. 
This is inversely related to debt. It seems reasonable that, when a company has funds to 
invest, one of the first options should be to re-invest in the company itself. We would 
therefore expect a negative link with the likelihood of franchising. 
d) Return on assets (Re), defined as Operating results / Total assets. This indicates the 
company’s performance achieved as a result of its investment in assets, irrespective of its 
financial structure
11. We consider that the greater the return on assets, the lower the likelihood 
that a company will franchise because, with greater returns on its own investments, the 
company is likely to be more interested in using other sources of finance apart from 
franchising
12. 
e) The ANTG variable covers the number of years that the different chains have been 
working as franchises in Spain
13. It is assumed that the less experience a franchisor has, the 
more difficult it will be to obtain finance, so it is more likely that it will turn to franchisees for 
funds. 
f) Establishments in foreign countries (EXTJ) estimates the effort required and 
difficulty involved in supervising the manager by measuring the number of establishments 
held by each chain in foreign countries. Since franchising makes it cheaper to supervise a set 
of dispersed units, the chains with the largest numbers of establishments outside Spain will be 
those with the largest proportion of franchised establishments. This is because, having an 
                                                 
10 Norton (1995) and Combs and Ketchen (1999) used this variable. 
11 Combs and Ketchen (1999) use this variable, amongst others, to test the financial argument. 
12 Such as borrowing or expanding share capital. 
13 This same variable was used by Caves and Murphy (1976), Lafontaine and Kaufmann (1994), Minkler and 
Park (1994), Combs and Castrogiovanni (1994), López and Ventura (2002), Dant and Kaufmann (2003) and 
Castrogiovanni, Combs and Justis (2006). 
  15extensive, complex network, they need to resort more to franchising because they are unable 
to supervise the managers of their establishments directly
14. 
g) Minimum population (PMIN) measures the effort needed to achieve success for the 
establishment. It covers the minimum population required by the chain, in millions, in a 
specific town for a franchisee to open an establishment there. It will be the chains offering 
more specialised products or services that require a larger minimum population, because the 
demand is small and they have to achieve returns on the investment made. So, if a small 
percentage of the population is interested in the product, each customer is very important for 
the business and the manager of the establishment has to make a greater effort to attract and 
retain each one.  
Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
Variable  Mean Std.  Dev. Mín.  Max.  N 
PFDOS  0.642 0.307 0.000 1.000 2765 
INVINI  0.079 0.104 0.000 1.683 3138 
END  82.305 59.354 0.000 993.220 3782 
LIQUID  4.019 98.439  -2.230  5267.020  3747 
Re  -0.035 1.092  -33.784  10.318 3792 
ANTG  5.304 6.657 0.000  84.000  5469 
EXTJ  11.522 134.729 0.000 6000.000 2706 
PMIN  0.058 0.065 0.000 0.750 2134 
Table 3: Correlations 
 PFDOS  INVINI  END  LIQUID  Re  ANTG  EXTJ  PMIN 
PFDOS  1.00000             
INVINI  -0.1131  1.00000           
END 0.0057  -0.0836  1.00000           
LIQUID -0.0356  -0.0306  -0.1741  1.00000         
Re  0.1273 0.0450 -0.1546  -0.1209  1.00000       
ANTG 0.1594 0.0507 -0.1540  0.0542  0.0805  1.00000     
EXTJ 0.0485  -0.0074  -0.0490 0.0035  0.0217  0.0487  1.00000  
PMIN -0.1043  0.3060 -0.0090 -0.0139  0.0265  -0.0277 -0.0351  1.00000 
 
                                                 
14 Lafontaine (1992) and Castrogiovanni, Combs and Justis (2006) also use this variable as a proxy for the cost 
of supervision. 
  164. RESULTS 
Table 4 gives the results of the econometric model obtained using the Stata 8.0 programme. In 
the first column, we consider initial investment, debt and age as ways of measuring financial 
aspects. In the second column, we consider the company’s liquidity instead of debt, given the 
link between them. And in the third column we consider return on assets for the same reason. 
In parallel, in all cases we considered the variables for minimum population and the presence 
of establishments in foreign countries to estimate the agency argument. We also consider a 
group of dummy variables by year, in an attempt to note time effects. 
The method for calculation uses a number of instruments, including lags on variables, to solve 
the problem of endogeneity in some variables. In our case, we consider there may be 
endogeneity in debt, liquidity ratio, return on assets, initial investment and the presence of 
foreign establishments, with only the age of the chain being exogenous. The coefficients for 
these instruments are not given, this being a convention in this methodology and also to 
simplify the table. 
Firstly, it should be noted that both the debt parameters in the first column and the liquidity 
ratio in the second as well as return on assets in the third are significant and have the expected 
sign, as predicted by the financial argument. This is clearly in support of the financial 
argument. The greater the liquidity and return on assets and the lower the debt, the lower the 
use of franchising. 
Secondly, it is surprising to note the lack of significance of the initial investment and opposite 
sign for experience. The initial investment variable has been used in many other prior works, 
with very varying results
15. A probable explanation for this is that there is a double opposing 
effect. On the hand, the funding problem leads franchisors to try to franchise some of their 
establishments but, on the other, it is difficult to find franchisees. This is because the greater 
the value of the initial investment, the greater the risk taken by the manager of the 
establishment and the greater the tendency for the franchisor to integrate its points of sale as 
                                                 
15 While authors such as Brickley and Dark (1987), Brickley, Dark and Weisbach (1991), Lafontaine (1992) and 
López and Ventura (2002) find that the greater the initial investment the lower the probability of franchising, 
going against the financial argument, others such as Thompson (1992) and Martin and Justis (1993), find the 
opposite. 
  17this allows assignation of the risk variability to the party for whom this is least costly, namely, 
the franchisor
16. 
Table 4: Factors determining the probability of franchising 
Variable  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
PFDOS t-1  0.2190*** 
(5.90) 
0.3116*** 
(8.73) 
0.2639*** 
(8.47) 
INVINI 
0.0738 
(0.71) 
-0.0312 
(-0.33) 
0.0408 
(-2.90) 
END  0.0003** 
(2.18) 
  
LIQUID 
 
 
-0.0044** 
(-2.28) 
 
Re 
   -0.0287* 
(-1.78) 
ANTG 
0,204** 
(1.96) 
0.0072 
(1.53) 
0.0050 
(1.37) 
EXTJ 
0.0000 
(0.01) 
0.0002 
(1.31) 
-0.0002* 
(-1.70) 
PMIN 
-0.5740*** 
(-2.62) 
-0.2810** 
(-1.81) 
-0.2630 
(-1.12) 
dy98 
0.0097*** 
(3.16) 
 0.0103** 
(2.47) 
0.0126*** 
(4.54) 
dy00 
-0.0113* 
(-1.81) 
-0.0124* 
(-1.94) 
-0.0042 
(-0.75) 
dy01 
-0.0389*** 
(-4.01) 
-0.0429*** 
(-4.30) 
-0.0334*** 
(-3.55) 
dy02 
-0.0574*** 
(-4.14) 
-0.0547*** 
(-3.69) 
-0.0453*** 
(-4.08) 
m1 -1.69* -1.79*  -1.74* 
m2 -1.30 -1.50  -1.12 
Sargan Test  45.77  45.82  42.34 
Observations 322  322  325 
Chains 156  157  158 
Note: Statistic t in brackets ***, **, * = Significant at 99%, 95% and 90% respectively. 
Experience is also significant in the first model but with the opposite sign, positive. This 
indicates that the greater the experience, the more franchised establishments there will be. 
This is a result that cannot be based on capital scarcity. However, in the other models it is not 
                                                 
16 The franchisee is more risk averse than the franchisor because, while the former is usually an individual 
entrepreneur whose assets or income is related to the results of his own establishment, the latter is normally a 
larger company, probably having another financial partner which may even be a private equity company. 
Authors such as Brickley and Dark (1987), Brickley, Dark and Weisbach (1991, Lafontaine (1992, 1993, 1995) 
and Perales and Vázquez (2003) support this argument. 
  18significant and the parameter varies substantially so there are doubts about the soundness of 
this result. Moreover, it must be seen in opposition to the general trend noted in time 
variables, most of which are significant, to reduce the tendency to franchise. Both the 
significance and the coefficients for the time variables indicate that, in comparison with the 
reference year of 1999, the percentage of franchised establishments gradually decreases. 
These results tally with the general trend noted by Pénard, Raynaud and Saussier (2003) and 
Lafontaine  and Shaw (2005). 
With regard to the variables on the agency argument, the results vary. While the EXTJ 
variable, which aims to measure the costs of supervising the manager of the establishment, is 
positive as expected although not significant, in the first two models, the PMIN variable is 
negative in all the models and significant in the first two. This goes against our predictions. 
Finally, we note that the partial adjustment model for ownership structure is verified. The 
coefficient of the lagged dependent variable is very significant. This gives us an adjustment 
speed of 78-69%. Such a high speed is to be expected because franchisors are able to use 
good tools for adjusting it. But it should be remembered that they cannot always find the 
franchisees they are looking for, especially not in the towns in which they are interested. This 
may force them to open up owned establishments in order to preserve their competitive edge 
or to occupy promising premises of the sort that are not easy to find in large towns. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
This study analyses whether the difficulty of gaining access to limited resources, especially 
funding, is a determinant factor for the probability of franchising for Spanish chains. We 
argue that the cost of achieving business growth through franchising is lower than that of 
other formulae such as debt or the introduction of new financial partners. This goes against 
much of the existing literature. We took a data panel with information on franchise chains 
operating in Spain during the period 1996-2002. This methodology allows us to control for 
unobservable heterogeneity and to note the individual effects for each chain, which cannot be 
observed in cross-cutting regressions. We also use a dynamic partial-adjustment model for 
ownership structure of the chains, with the generalised method of moments in first 
differences. This allows us not only to introduce autoregression but also to use endogenous 
explanatory variables. 
  19The results obtained show clearly that the greater a chain’s liquidity and return on assets and 
the lower its debt, the less probable it is that it will franchise establishments. This supports the 
capital scarcity argument. However, the initial investment variable is not significant and the 
variable for age of the chain does not have the expected sign. These last two results tie in with 
much of the previous literature studying the effect of capital scarcity on the probability of 
franchising. This apparent contradiction may be due to the variables used in such studies. 
Since there are no variables to directly estimate capital scarcity, indirect variables have 
traditionally been used for age or size of the chain even though they might reflect a dual, 
opposing effect – on  the one hand, the greater the initial investment, the more difficult it is 
for the franchisor to find the resources needed to expand the business so he is more likely to 
resort to franchising as a means of funding but, on the other, the risk faced by potential 
franchisees, who are more risk averse than the franchisor, would be greater so the franchisor 
would choose to keep the establishments under his ownership. With regard to the age 
variable, this might measure the result of the franchisor’s effort rather than the ease or 
difficulty for obtaining funding because, after developing his business for a number of years, 
he has now created a good image so it will be easier to attract good, new franchisees as they 
know they are entering a profitable business. 
Finally, we verify the partial adjustment of the ownership structure, with a very significant 
lagged dependent variable. This gives a very high adjustment speed of 78-69%. This was to 
be expected because the franchisors have good tools for adapting it. 
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